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We argue that mechanistic models elaborated by machine learning cannot be explanatory 
by discussing the relation between mechanistic models, explanation and the notion of 
intelligibility of models. We show that the ability of biologists to understand the model 
that they work with (i.e. intelligibility) severely constrains their capacity of turning the 
model into an explanatory model. The more a mechanistic model is complex (i.e. it 
includes an increasing number of components), the less explanatory it will be. Since 
machine learning increases its performances when more components are added, then it 
generates models which are not intelligible, and hence not explanatory. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Due to its data-intensive turn, molecular biology is increasingly making use of machine 
learning (ML) methodologies. ML is the study of generalizable extraction of patterns 
from data sets starting from a problem. A problem here is defined as a given set of input 
variables, a set of outputs which have to be calculated, and a sample (previously input-
output pairs already observed). ML calculates a quantitative relation between inputs and 
outputs in terms of a predictive model by learning from an already structured set of input-
output pairs. ML is expected to increase its performances when the complexity of data 
sets increase, where complexity refers to the number of input variables and the number of 
samples. Due to this capacity to handle complexity, practitioners think that ML is 
potentially able to deal with biological systems at the macromolecular level, which are 
notoriously complex. The development of ML has been proven useful not just for the 																																																								
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complexity of biological systems per se, but also because biologists now are able to 
generate an astonishingly amount of data. However, we claim that the ability of ML to 
deal with complex systems and big data comes at a price; the more ML can model 
complex data sets, the less biologists will be able to explain phenomena in a mechanistic 
sense.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss mechanistic 
models in biology, and we emphasize a surprising connection between explanation and 
model complexity. By adapting de Regt’s notion of pragmatic understanding (2017) in 
the present context, we claim that if a how-possibly mechanistic model can become 
explanatory, then it must be intelligible to the modeler (Section 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4). 
Intelligibility is the ability to perform precise and successful material manipulations on 
the basis of the information provided by the model about its components. The results of 
these manipulations are fundamental to recompose the causal structure of a mechanism 
out of a list of causally relevant entities. Like a recipe, the model must provide 
instructions to ‘build’ the phenomenon, and causal organization is fundamental in this 
respect. If a model is opaque to these organizational aspects, then no mechanistic 
explanations can be elaborated. By drawing on studies in cognitive psychology, we show 
that the more the number of components in a model increases (the more the model is 
complex), the less the model is intelligible, and hence the less an explanation can be 
elaborated.  
Next, we briefly introduce ML (Section 3). As an example of ML application to 
biology, we analyze an algorithm called PARADIGM (Vaske et al 2010), which is used 
in biomedicine to predict clinical outcomes from molecular data (Section 3.1). This 
algorithm predicts the activities of genetic pathways from multiple genome-scale 
measurements on a single patient by integrating information on pathways from different 
databases. By discussing the technical aspects of this algorithm, we will show how the 
algorithm generates models which are more accurate as the number of variables included 
in the model increases. By variables, here we mean biological entities included in the 
model and the interactions between them, since those entities are modeled by variables in 
PARADIGM.  
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In Section 4 we will put together the results of Section 2 and 3. While performing 
complex localizations more accurately, we argue that an algorithm like PARADIGM 
makes mechanistic models so complex (in terms of the number of model components) 
that no explanation can be constructed. In other words, ML applied to molecular biology 
undermines biologists’ explanatory abilities. 
 
2. COMPLEXITY AND EXPLANATIONS IN BIOLOGY  
 
The use of machine learning has important consequences for the explanatory dimension 
of molecular biology. Algorithms like PARADIGM, while providing increasingly 
accurate localizations, challenge the explanatory abilities of molecular biologists, 
especially if we assume the account of explanation of the so-called mechanistic 
philosophy (Craver and Darden 2013; Craver 2007; Glennan 2017). In order to see how, 
we need to introduce the notion of mechanistic explanation, and its connection with the 
notion of intelligibility (de Regt 2017). 
 
2.1 Mechanistic explanations 
Molecular biology’s aim is to explain how phenomena are produced and/or maintained 
by the organization instantiated by macromolecules. Such explanations take the form of 
mechanistic descriptions of these dynamics. As Glennan (2017) succinctly emphasizes, 
mechanistic models (often in the form of diagrams complemented by linguistic 
descriptions) are vehicles for mechanistic explanations. Such explanations show how a 
phenomenon is produced/maintained and constituted by a mechanism – mechanistic 
models explain by explaining how. As Glennan and others have noticed, a mechanistic 
description of a phenomenon looks like what in historical narrative is called causal 
narrative, in the sense that it “describes sequences of events (which will typically be 
entities acting and interacting), and shows how their arrangement in space and time 
brought about some outcome” (Glennan 2017, p 83). The main idea is that we take a set 
of entities and activities to be causally relevant to a phenomenon, and we explain the 
phenomenon by showing how a sequence of events involving the interactions of the 
selected entities produces and/or maintains the explanandum. In epistemic terms, it is a 
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matter of showing a chain of inferences that holds between the components of a model 
(e.g. biological entities). Consider for instance the phenomenon of restriction in certain 
bacteria and archaea (Figure 1). This phenomenon has been explained in terms of certain 
entities (e.g. restriction and modification enzymes) and activities (e.g. methylation). 
Anytime a bacteriophage invades one of these bacteria or archaea (from now on host 
cells), host cells stimulate the production of two types of enzymes, i.e. a restriction 
enzyme and a modification enzyme. The restriction enzyme is designed to recognize and 
cut specific DNA sequences. Such sequences, for reasons we will not expose here2, are to 
be found in the invading phages and/or viruses. Hence, the restriction enzyme destroys 
the invading entities by cutting their DNA. However, the restriction enzyme is not able to 
distinguish between the invading DNA and the DNA of the host cell. Here the 
modification enzyme helps, by methylating the DNA of the host cell at specific 
sequences (the same that the restriction enzyme cuts), thereby preventing the restriction 
enzyme to destroy the DNA of the host cell. The explanation of the phenomenon of 
restriction is in terms of a narrative explaining how certain entities and processes 
contribute to the production of the phenomenon under investigation. The inferences take 
place by thinking about the characteristics of the entities involved, and how the whole 
functioning of the system can be recomposed from entities themselves. 
 
																																																								
2 See for instance (Ratti 2018) 





2.2. Complexity of mechanistic models 
Despite the voluminous literature on mechanistic explanation, there is a connection 
between models, in fieri explanations and the modeler that has not been properly 
characterized. In particular, mechanistic models should be intelligible to modelers in 
order to be turned into complete explanations. Craver noticed something like that when 
he states that his ideal of completeness of a mechanistic description (in terms of 
molecular details) should not be taken literary, but completeness always refer to the 
particular explanatory context one is considering. The reason why literary completeness 
is unattainable is because complete models will be of no use and completely obscure to 
modelers; “such descriptions would include so many potential factors that they would be 
unwieldy for the purpose of prediction and control and utterly unilluminating to human 
beings” (2006, p 360, emphasis added).  
We rephrase Craver’s intuitions by saying that how-possibly models cannot be 
turned into adequate explanations if they are too complex. We define complexity as a 
function of the number of entities and activities (i.e. components of the model) that have 
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to be coordinated in an organizational structure in the sense specified by mechanistic 
philosophers. This means that no agent can organize the entities and/or activities 
localized by highly complex models in a narration that rightly depicts the organizational 
structure of the explanandum. Therefore, very complex models which are very good in 
localization cannot be easily turned into explanations. Let us show why complex models 
cannot be turned into explanatory models in the mechanistic context. 
 
2.3 Intelligibility of mechanistic models 
The idea that agents cannot turn highly complex mechanistic models into explanations 
can be made more precise by appealing to the notion of intelligibility (de Regt 2017). 
By following the framework of models as mediators (Morgan and Morrison 
1999), de Regt argues that models are the way theories are applied to reality. Similar to 
Giere (2010), de Regt thinks that theories provide principles which are then articulated in 
the form of models to explain phenomena; “[t]he function of a model is to represent the 
target system in such a way that the theory can be applied to it” (2017, p 34). He assumes 
a broad meaning of explanation, in the sense that explanations are arguments, namely 
attempts to “answer the question of why a particular phenomenon occurs or a situation 
obtains (…) by presenting a systematic line of reasoning that connects it with other 
accepted items of knowledge” (2017, p 25). Ça va sans dire, arguments of the sort are not 
limited to linguistic items3. On this basis, de Regt’s main thesis is that a condition sine 
qua non to elaborate an explanation is that the theory from which it is derived must be 
intelligible.  
 In de Regt’s view, the intelligibility of a theory (for scientists) is “[t]he value that 
scientists attribute to the cluster of virtues (…) that facilitate the use of the theory for the 
construction of models” (p 593). This is because an important aspect of obtaining 
explanations is to derive models from theories, and to do that a scientist must use the 
theories. Therefore, if a theory possesses certain characteristics that make it easier to be 
used by a scientist, then the same scientist will be in principle more successful in deriving 
explanatory models. In (2015) de Regt extends this idea also to models in the sense that 
“understanding consists in being able to use and manipulate the model in order to make 																																																								
3 Mechanistic explanations are arguments, though not of a logical type 
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inferences about the system, to predict and control its behavior” (2015, p 3791). If for 
some reasons models and theories are not intelligible (to us), then we will not be able to 
develop an explanation, because we would not know how to use models or theories to 
elaborate one. 
This idea of intelligibility of models and its tight connection with scientific 
explanation, can be straightforwardly extended to mechanistic models. Intelligibility of 
mechanistic models is defined by the way we successfully use them to explain 
phenomena. But how do we use models (mechanistic models in particular), and for what? 
Please keep in mind that whatever we do with mechanistic models, it is with explanatory 
aims in mind. Anything from predicting, manipulating, abstracting, etc is because we 
want an explanation. This is a view shared both by mechanistic philosophers but by de 
Regt as well, whose analysis of intelligibility is in explanatory terms. 
First, highly abstract models can be used to build more specific models, as in the 
case of schema (Machamer et al 2000; Levy 2014). A schema is “a truncated abstract 
description of a mechanism that can be filled with descriptions of known component 
parts and activities” (Machamer et al 2000, p 16). For instance, consider the model of 
transcription. This model can be highly abstract where ‘gene’ stands for any gene, and 
‘transcription factor’ stands for any transcription factor. However, we can instantiate such 
a schema in a particular experimental context by specifying which gene and which 
transcription factors are involved. The idea is that biologists, depending on the specific 
context they are operating, can instantiate experiments to find out which particular gene 
or transcription factor is involved in producing a phenomenon at a given time.  
Next, mechanistic models can be used in the context of the build-it test (Craver 
and Darden 2013) with confirmatory goals in mind. Since mechanistic explanations may 
be understood as recipes for construction, and since recipes provide instructions to use a 
set of ingredients and instruments to produce something (e.g. a cake), then mechanistic 
models provide instructions to build a phenomenon or instructions to modify it in 
controlled ways because, after all, they tell us about the internal division of labor between 
entities causally relevant to producing or maintaining phenomena. This is in essence the 
build-it test as a confirmation tool; by modifying an experimental system on the basis of 
the ‘instructions’ provided by the model that allegedly explains such a phenomenon, we 
Ratti & López-Rubio – Mechanistic Models and the Explanatory Limits of 
Machine Learning 
8 
get hints as to how the model is explanatory. If the hypothesized modifications produce 
in the ‘real-world’ the consequences we have predicted on the basis of the model, then 
the explanatory adequacy of the model is corroborated. The more the modifications 
suggested are precise, the more explanatory the model will be4. A first lesson we can 
draw is that if a mechanistic model is explanatory, then it is also intelligible, because it is 
included in the features of being explanatory mechanistically the fact that we can use the 
model to perform a build-it test. 
The build-it test is also useful as a tool to develop explanations. Consider again 
the case of restriction in bacteria and a how-possibly model of this phenomenon based on 
a few observations. Let’s say that we have noticed that when phages or viruses are unable 
to grow in specific bacteria, such bacteria also produce two types of enzymes. We know 
that the enzymes, the invading phages/viruses and restriction are correlated. The basic 
model will be as follows; anytime a phage or a virus invade a bacterium, these enzymes 
are produced, and hence the immune system of the bacterium must be related to these 
enzymes. We start then to instantiate experiments on the basis of this simple model. Such 
a model suggests that these enzymes must do something to the invading entities, but that 
somehow modify the host cell as well. Therefore, the build-it test would consist in a set 
of experiments to stimulate and/or inhibit these entities to develop our ideas about the 
nature of their causal relevance and their internal division of labor. In fieri mechanistic 
models suggest a range of instructions to ‘build’ or ‘maintain’ phenomena. These 
instructions are used to instantiate experiments to refine the model and make it 
explanatory. This is an example of what Bechtel and Richardson would call complex 
localization (2010, Chapter 6), and it is complex because the strategy used to explain the 
behavior of a system (immune system of host cells) is heavily constrained by empirical 
results of lower-levels. The how-possibly model affords a series of actions leading to a 
case of complex localization, when “constraints are imposed, whether empirical or 
theoretical, they can serve simultaneously to vindicate the initial localization and to 
develop it into a full-blooded mechanistic explanation” (Bechtel and Richardson 2010, p 
125). Therefore, if a how-possibly model can be turned into an explanatory model, then it 																																																								
4 Please note that such a test, when involving adequate mechanistic explanations, is also the 
preferred way to teach students in text books, or also a way to provide instructions to reproduce 
the results of a peer-reviewed article 
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is intelligible, because the way we turn it into an explanatory model is by instantiating 
build-it tests. 
A mechanistic model is therefore intelligible either when (a) it is a schema and we 
can instantiate such a model in specific contexts, or (b) when it affords a series of built-it 
test which are used either to corroborate its explanatory adequacy, or to make it 
explanatory. About (b), it should be noted that if we consider a mechanistic model as a 
narrative, then the model will be composed of a series of steps which influence each other 
in various ways. Being able to use a model means being able to anticipate what would 
happen to other steps if I modify one step in particular. This is not a yes/no thing. The 
model of restriction-modification systems is highly intelligible, because I know that if I 
prevent the production of modification enzymes I simultaneously realize that the 
restriction enzyme will destroy the DNA of the host cell. However, more detailed models 
will be less intelligible, because it would be difficult to simultaneously anticipate what 
would happen at each step by modifying a step in particular. 
 
2.4 Recomposing mechanisms and intelligibility 
In the mechanistic literature, the process of developing an explanatory model out of a 
catalogue of entities that are likely to be causally relevant to a phenomenon is called 
recomposition of a mechanism and it usually happens after a series of localization steps. 
To recompose a mechanism, a modeler must be able to identify causally relevant 
entities and their internal division of labor. The idea is not just to ‘divide up’ a given 
phenomenon in tasks, but also a given task in subtasks interacting in the overall 
phenomenon, as it happens in complex localization (Bechtel and Richardson 2010). In the 
simplest case, researchers assume linear interactions between tasks, but there may be also 
non-linear or more complex type of interactions. 
 These reasoning strategies are usually implemented by thinking about these 
dynamics with the aid of diagrams. Diagrammatic representations usually involve boxes 
standing for entities (such as genes, proteins, etc) and arrows standing for processes of 
various sorts (phosphorylation, methylation, binding, releasing, etc). Therefore, biologists 
recompose mechanisms as mechanistic explanations by thinking about these diagrams, 
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and they instantiate experiments (i.e. built-it test) exactly on the basis of such 
diagrammatic reasoning. 
 Cognitive psychology and studies of scientific cognition have extensively 
investigated the processes of diagrammatic reasoning (Hegarty 2000; 2004; Nersessian 
2008). Moreover, empirical studies have emphasized the role of diagrams in learning and 
reasoning in molecular biology (Kindfield 1998; Trujillo 2015). In these studies, 
diagrammatic reasoning is understood as a “task that involves inferring the behavior of a 
mechanical system from a visual-spatial representation” (Hegarty 2000, p 194). Hegarty 
refers to this process as mental animation, while Nersessian (2008) thinks about this as an 
instantiation of mental modelling. This is analogous to thinking about mechanistic models 
as narratives, namely being able to infer how a course of events, decomposed into steps, 
may change if we change one step in particular. Mental animation is a process of 
complex visual-spatial inference. Limits and capabilities of humans in such tasks depend 
on the cognitive architecture of human mind5. What Hegarty has found is that mental 
animation is piecemeal, in the sense that human mind does not animate the components 
of a diagram in parallel, but rather infer the motion of components one by one. This 
strategy has a straightforward consequence; in order to proceed with animating 
components, we should store intermediate results of inferences drawn on previous 
components. Due to the limitations of working memory (WM), people usually store such 
information on external displays. Hegarty has provided evidence that diagrammatic 
reasoning is bounded to WM abilities. The more we proceed in inferring animation on 
later components, the more the inferences on earlier components degrade (see for 
instance Figure 2); “as more components of the system are ‘read into’ spatial working 
memory, the activation of all items is degraded, so that when later components are in, 
there is not enough activation of the later components to infer their motion” (Hegarty 
2000, p 201).  
																																																								
5 On this, I rely on the framework assumed by the cognitive-load theory (Paas et al 2010) 





The actual limit of our cognitive architecture on this respect may be debated, and it is an 
empirical issue. The important point is that no matter our external displays, for very large 
systems (such as Figure 3) it is very unlikely that human cognition will be able to process 
all information about elements interactivity. This is because by animating components 
one-by-one, even if we use sophisticated instruments such computer simulations, still 
inferences on earlier components will degrade. This means that build-it tests will be very 
ineffective, if not impossible. In terms of narratives, recipes and mechanistic models, this 
means that for large mechanistic diagrams with many model components, no human 
would be able to anticipate the consequences of modifying a step in the model for all the 
other steps of the model, even if a computer simulation shows that the phenomenon can 
be possibly produced by the complex model. The computer simulation may highlight 
certain aspects (as Bechtel in 2016 notes), but the model is not intelligible in the sense 
required by mechanistic philosophy. If the model is not intelligible in this way, then it 
cannot be possibly turned into an explanation. 




 The results of Hegarty’s research suggest that when mechanistic models are 
concerned, strategies of localization are effective (in terms of explanatory potential) only 
when a limited number of model components are actually identified. The number may 
increase if we use computer simulations. However, for very large amounts of model 
components (such as Figure 3) recomposition is just impossible for humans, because 
inferences on the role of components in the causal division of labor of a phenomenon will 
degrade to make place for inferences about other components. This of course holds only 
if we have explanatory aims in mind. 
 To summarize, in section 2 we have made three claims: 
1. If a how-possibly model can be turned into an explanation, then it is intelligible 
2. If a model is not intelligible, then it cannot become explanatory  
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3. MACHINE LEARNING AND LOCALIZATIONS 
Machine learning (ML) is a subfield of computer science which studies the design of 
computing machinery that improves its performance as it learns from its environment. A 
ML algorithm extracts knowledge from the input data, so that it can give better solutions 
to the problem that it is meant to solve. This learning process usually involves the 
automatic construction and refinement of a model of the incoming data. In ML 
terminology, a model is an information structure which is stored in the computer memory 
and manipulated by the algorithm.  
As mentioned before, the concept of ‘problem’ in ML has a specific meaning 
which is different from other fields of science. A ML problem is defined by a set of input 
variables, a set of output variables, and a collection of samples which are input-output 
pairs. Solving a problem here means finding a quantitative relation between inputs and 
outputs in the form of a predictive model, in the sense that the algorithm will be used to 
produce a certain output given the presence of a specific input.  
 
3.1 The PARADIGM algorithm 
ML has been applied in the molecular sciences in many ways (Libbrecht and Noble 
2015). Especially in cancer research6, computer scientists have created and trained a great 
deal of algorithms in order to identify entities that are likely to be involved in the 
development of tumors, how they interact, to predict phenotypes, to recognize crucial 
sequences, etc (see for instance Leung et al 2016). 
As a topical example of ML applied to biology, we introduce an algorithm called 
PARADIGM (Vaske et al 2010). This algorithm is used to infer how genetic changes in a 
patient influence or disrupt important genetic pathways underlying cancer progression. 
This is important because there is empirical evidence that “when patients harbor genomic 
alterations or aberrant expression in different genes, these genes often participate in a 
common pathway” (Vaske et al 2010, p i237). Because pathways are so large and 
biologists cannot hold in their mind the entities participating in them, PARADIGM 
integrate several genomic datasets – including datasets about interactions between genes 
and phenotypic consequences – to infer molecular pathways altered in patients; it predicts 																																																								
6 See for instance The Cancer Genome Atlas at https://cancergenome.nih.gov 
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whether a patient will have specific pathways disrupted given his/her genetic mutations. 
 The algorithm is based on a simplified model of the cell. Each biological pathway 
is modeled by a graph. Each graph contains a set of nodes, such that each node represents 
a cell entity, like a mRNA, a gene or a complex. A node can be only in three states (i.e. 
activated, normal or deactivated). The connections among nodes are called factors, and 
they represent the influence of some entities on other entities. It must be noticed that the 
model does not represent why or how these influences are exerted. Only the sign of the 
influence, i.e. positive or negative, is specified. 
The model specifies how the expected state of an entity must be estimated. The 
entities which are connected by positive or negative factors to the entity at hand cast 
votes which are computed by multiplying +1 or –1 by the states of those entities, 
respectively. In addition to this, there are 'maximum' and 'minimum' connections to cast 
votes which are the maximum or the minimum of the states of the connected entities, 
respectively. Overall, the expected state of an entity is computed as the result of 
combining several votes obtained from the entities which are connected to it. Such a 
voting procedure can be associated to localizations (i.e. whether a node is activated or 
not), but hardly to biological explanations. 
The states of the entities can be hidden, i.e. they can not be directly measured on 
the patients, or observable. The states of the hidden variables must be estimated by a 
probabilistic inference algorithm, which takes into account the states of the observed 
variables and the factors to estimate the most likely values of the hidden variables. Here it 
must be pointed out that this algorithm does not yield any explanation about the 
computed estimation. Moreover, it could be the case that the estimated values are not the 
most likely ones, since the algorithm does not guarantee that it finds the globally 
optimum solution. 
The size of the model is determined by the number of entities and factors that the 
scientist wishes to insert. A larger model provides a perspective of the cell processes 
which contains more elements, and it might yield better predictions. This means that the 
more components the model has, the better the algorithm will perform. In biological 
terms, the larger the model, the more precise complex localizations the algorithm will 
identify, in particular by pointing more precisely towards pathways that are likely to be 
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disrupted in the patient with more information about the state of gene activities, 
complexes and cellular processes. Importantly, PARADIGM does not infer new genetic 
interactions, but it just helps identifying those known interaction in a new data set. It is 
completely supervised, in the sense that “[w]hile it infers hidden quantities (…), it makes 
no attempt to infer new interactions not already present in an NCI [National Cancer 
institute database] pathway” (Vaske et al 2010, p i244). 
 
4 COMPLEX MODELS AND MECHANISTIC EXPLANATIONS  
Before unwinding our conclusions, let me recall the results of Section 2 very briefly: 
1. If a how-possibly model can be turned into an explanation, then it is intelligible7. 
2. If a model is not intelligible, then it cannot become explanatory  
3. Complex model (in the sense explained in 2.2) are not intelligible  
 
What does this have to do with PARADIGM? It is important to emphasize what we have 
pointed out in Section 3.1, namely that an algorithm like PARADIGM is more efficient 
when working with more components. If we think about models generated by algorithms 
such as PARADIGM in mechanistic terms, this means that the algorithm provides more 
precise complex localizations, because more entities that are likely to be causally relevant 
to a phenomenon are identified, and the information about the probability of a pathway 
being disrupted in a patient will be more precise. However, the models will be more 
complex, and they will be decreasingly intelligible. This is because the final model will 
count an elevated number of components, and recomposing these components into a full-
fledged mechanistic explanation of how a tumor is behaving will be cognitively very 
difficult; the inferences about the behavior of components are not run in parallel, but one 
by one, and once we proceed in inferring the behavior of a component on the basis of the 
behavior of another component, other inferences will degrade, as Hegarty’s studies have 
shown. In the ideal situation, PARADIGM will generate unintelligible models: 																																																								
7 Remember: A mechanistic model x is intelligible to a modeler y if y can use the information 
about the components of x to instantiate so-called ‘build-it test’. Such tests are performed on how-
possibly models to turn them into explanatory models by obtaining information on how to 
recompose a phenomenon (i.e. by showing how a list of biological entities are organized to 
produce a phenomenon).  	




4. Algorithms such as PARADIGM generate models which are not intelligible 
because such models are too complex 
5. Because of 2, 3 and 4, complex models generated out of algorithms like 
PARADIGM cannot become explanations 
 
This means that when we use algorithms such as PARADIGM to cope with the 
complexity of biological systems, we successfully handle big data sets, but such a 
mastery comes at a price. Using ML in molecular biology means providing more detailed 
localizations, but we also lose explanatory power, because no modeler will be able to 
recompose the mechanism out of a long list of entities. 
 This implies that, in the mechanistic epistemic horizon, the central role assigned 
to explanations should be reconsidered when contemporary molecular biosciences are 
concerned. As Bechtel has also emphasized in the context of computational models in 
mechanistic research (2016), such tools are useful to show whether some entities are 
likely to be involved in a particular phenomenon or suggest alternative hypotheses about 
the relation between certain entities. However, providing fully-fledged mechanistic 
explanations is another thing. It is the same with algorithms of ML; we identify more 
entities likely to be involved in a mechanism, we may even find out that entities involved 
in specific process may be connected with entities involved in other processes (via for 
instance Gene Ontology enrichments), but we cannot recompose a mechanism out of a 
list of hundreds of entities. In fact, we come to value different epistemic values, and 
explanatory power is not one of them. This somehow implies also a shift in the way 
scientific articles are organized; if in ‘traditional’ molecular biology evidence converges 
towards the characterization of a single mechanism, in data-intensive biology we make a 
list of entities that can be involved in a phenomenon, but we do not necessarily connect 
those entities mechanistically (Alberts 2012). Another strategy (Krogan et al 2015) – 
though motivated more by biologically rather than cognitive reasons – is to abstract from 
macromolecular entities and consider only aggregates of them in the form of networks; 
whether establishing network topology is providing a mechanistic explanation remains an 
open question. 
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